SILESIAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY PUBLISHING HOUSE

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF SILESIAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY 2026
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT SERIES NO. 255

TENSIONS BETWEEN LEADER INTERESTS AND ORGANIZATIONAL LOGIC: EXECUTIVE MOTIVATION AND COMPENSATION

Tomasz ROSIAK[1*], Agnieszka POSTUŁA[2], Piotr PAWLAK[3]

[1] University of Warsaw; tomasz.rosiak@uw.edu.pl, ORCID: 0000-0001-8599-3862
[2] University of Warsaw; apostula@wz.uw.edu.pl, ORCID: 0000-0001-9495-0733
[3] Deloitte; piotr.pawlak@deloittece.com, ORCID: 0009-0002-7116-0821
* Correspondence author

Purpose: This article examines tensions between leaders' individual interests and organizational logic, with a focus on managerial motivation and executive compensation systems. The study conceptualizes the individual–organization relationship as a dynamic field of tensions arising from competing goals, values, and time horizons.
Design/methodology/approach: The study represents a pilot phase of a broader research project and adopts a qualitative design. It is based on in-depth interviews with management board members, chief financial officers, and members and chairs of supervisory boards from public, private, and family-owned companies.
Findings: Thematic analysis identified key sources of tension, including short-term financial performance pressure, formalized KPI-based evaluation systems, constraints on managerial autonomy, and misalignment between intrinsic motivation and financial incentives. Compensation systems may either mitigate or intensify these tensions, depending on their design, ownership context, and the quality of corporate governance.
Research limitations/implications: As a qualitative study, the findings are subject to limited generalizability. The results reveal mechanisms and interpretations but do not indicate the prevalence of the observed phenomena. These limitations point to the need for further quantitative and comparative research.
Practical implications: The findings underscore the importance of designing executive compensation and corporate governance systems that account for the multidimensional nature of managerial motivation and the ownership context of organizations.
Originality/value: The study's originality lies in applying a qualitative perspective of top-level organizational actors in the Polish context, offering an inside view of tensions between leaders' interests and organizational logic. It integrates agency theory with behavioral, institutional, and paradox perspectives to examine real decision-making dilemmas related to executive compensation and corporate governance.
Keywords: individual-organization relationship, management, motivation, compensation systems, organizational tensions, corporate governance.
Category of the paper: Action research.

1. Introduction

The relationship between the individual and the organization has long been a core concern in management sciences. Classical approaches framed it in terms of alignment, control, and coordination, assuming that goal discrepancies could be minimized through appropriate structures and management systems. Contemporary research, however, increasingly departs from equilibrium models in favour of a tension and paradox perspective, emphasizing that organizing involves maintaining a dynamic balance between competing demands rather than achieving stable goal congruence (Smith, Lewis, 2011; Putnam et al., 2016; Schad et al., 2016; Rosiak et al., 2024).

From this perspective, conflicting expectations are not anomalies but enduring features of organizational life, particularly under conditions of stakeholder pluralism, performance pressure, and competing institutional logics. These tensions manifest relationally through processes of sensemaking and meaning negotiation that shape how roles, goals, and responsibilities are understood (Weick et al., 2005).

One key mechanism structuring the leader-organization relationship is the compensation system. In the classical agency view, compensation serves to align interests by linking pay to performance (Jensen, Murphy, 1990). Yet the literature documents significant unintended effects, including short-termism, metric gaming, and the reinforcement of opportunistic behaviour (Bebchuk, Fried, 2003). Motivation research further suggests that strong reliance on external incentives and formalized KPIs may crowd out autonomous motivation and instrumentalize organizational goals (Ryan, Deci, 2000; Strathern, 1997; Pasieczny et al., 2024).

These tensions are also reflected in practitioner reports pointing to declining managerial engagement, increasing role complexity, and the limited explanatory power of traditional performance measures in changing work environments (Gallup; Deloitte; Microsoft & LinkedIn). Despite growing interest in organizational tensions, the relationship between leaders' self-interest and organizational logic remains empirically underexplored in qualitative research, particularly in the Polish context, where studies have focused primarily on formal governance arrangements and quantitative models.

This article addresses this gap by examining how leaders interpret and manage tensions between self-interest and organizational logic through the lens of motivation and compensation systems. It asks: (1) how organizational leaders understand these tensions in the context of compensation systems and board oversight, and (2) how compensation and corporate governance practices shape everyday managerial decisions and coping strategies.

The study draws on qualitative interviews with management board members, CFOs, and supervisory board members from public, private, and family firms. By focusing on lived managerial experiences, the article contributes theoretically by extending the individual-

organization relationship beyond a purely contractual perspective and practically by offering insights for the design of compensation systems and corporate governance mechanisms.

2. Literature review

2.1. The individual-organization relationship and organizational tensions

Contemporary management research increasingly conceptualizes the individual-organization relationship as a dynamic field of tensions rather than a state of equilibrium. Organizations operating under stakeholder pluralism, competing institutional logics, and performance pressures generate conflicting expectations, making tensions a persistent feature of everyday organizing (Smith, Lewis, 2011; Schad et al., 2016; Putnam et al., 2016).

Recent studies emphasize the relational nature of these tensions: they emerge not only from structures or strategies but from ongoing interactions involving meaning-making, identification, and negotiation between individuals and organizations (Weick et al., 2021; Fairhurst et al., 2020). Consequently, the individual-organization relationship becomes a crucial level of analysis for understanding value-related tensions, well-being, and goal conflicts.

2.2. Values, alignment, and competing logics

Organizational values shape the legitimacy of action and the meaning of work, yet research on person-organization fit shows that full value alignment is rare. Instead, relationships are typically characterized by partial and negotiated fit (Kristof-Brown et al., 2023). Tensions are especially salient when organizations simultaneously promote humanistic values (e.g. development, inclusiveness) and instrumental values (e.g. efficiency, control).

From an institutional logics perspective, these tensions arise from the coexistence of different rationalities of action—such as market, professional, or public logics—within the same organizational setting (Besharov, Smith, 2014; Thornton et al., 2018). Individuals often operate at the intersection of these logics, producing axiological ambivalence and normative contradiction. Empirical research links such value tensions to challenges to professional identity and authenticity, leading to reduced identification or selective engagement (Alvesson, Einola, 2019; Knoll et al., 2021). Polish studies highlight the salience of these dynamics in public and academic organizations, where declared values coexist with strong formal and metric-driven pressures (Jemielniak, Pruchniewska, 2020; Postuła, Rosiak, 2024).

2.3. Goal tensions in the individual-organization relationship

Organizational goals coordinate action but often appear to individuals as competing or contradictory demands. In classical agency theory, such tensions stem from the separation of ownership and control and divergent interests between principals and agents (Jensen, Meckling, 1976). Goals and performance systems function as contractual mechanisms designed to limit opportunism through monitoring and incentive alignment (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen, Murphy, 1990).

However, the literature shows that increasing goal formalization and metric-based control intensify individual-level tensions. Research on ambidexterity demonstrates that simultaneous pressures for exploration and exploitation generate persistent conflicts requiring continuous balancing (Raisch, Zimmermann, 2017; Papachroni et al., 2016). Within agency theory, this implies that agents face multiple, often incoherent contractual goals, encouraging selective attention to those most visible or rewarded.

Performance-based management systems further privilege measurable outcomes, frequently marginalizing less quantifiable goals such as learning, innovation, or well-being (Franco-Santos, Otley, 2018). Critical agency perspectives argue that excessive focus on financial and short-term metrics fosters behaviours that comply with contractual incentives while undermining broader organizational intentions (Holmström, Milgrom, 1991). When goals are perceived as detached from individual values, the relationship becomes increasingly instrumental, weakening moral responsibility and organizational identification (Kreiner et al., 2019; Knoll, van Dick, 2021).

Polish research underscores that such dynamics are particularly visible in highly formalized organizations, where indicators dominate over axiological dialogue and reflection on work meaning (Kostera, 2020; Jemielniak, 2022). In these contexts, mechanisms associated with agency theory, monitoring, goals, and bonuses, may paradoxically intensify tensions and reinforce short-term orientations.

2.4. Integration: the individual-organization relationship as a system of tensions

Overall, the literature suggests that value and goal tensions form an interconnected system within the individual-organization relationship. Values shape how goals are interpreted, while goal pressures influence daily experience, well-being, and individuals' capacity to cope with inconsistencies. This perspective aligns with recent developments in paradox theory, which emphasize the processual, multi-level, and relational nature of organizational tensions (Smith, Tracey, 2016; Schad et al., 2022).

3. Methodology of the study

The aim of the study was to deepen the understanding of the tensions between the individual interest of the leader and the logic of the organization, analyzed from the perspective of management motivation and the functioning of compensation systems. Due to the interpretative nature of the research problem, referring to the experiences, meanings and ways of understanding managerial decisions, a qualitative approach was used.

The study was designed in an interpretive paradigm, assuming the social construction of organizational reality and the relational nature of individual-organization tensions. In-depth individual interviews (IDI) of a semi-structured nature were adopted as a research strategy, which made it possible to maintain the comparability of topics while exploring emergent threads.

The selection of respondents was deliberate. The inclusion criterion was to perform a function enabling real influence on strategic decisions and direct contact with compensation systems and corporate governance. The study involved five interviewees acting as presidents of management boards, financial directors and members and chairmen of supervisory boards. Respondents represented public companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, large private companies and family businesses. This design of the sample allowed for the triangulation of organizational roles and ownership contexts, in accordance with the logic of qualitative research aimed at maximizing the diversity of experiences, rather than statistical representativeness.

The interviews were conducted between December 2025 and January 2026 in the form of face-to-face or remote meetings. The interviews lasted from 60 to 120 minutes, were recorded with the consent of the respondents and then transcribed. Full anonymity of participants and organizations was ensured.

The data analysis was reflective and comparative. Triangulation of the researcher, organizational roles and ownership contexts was used, as well as the analysis of contrasting cases (e.g. listed companies and family companies). The interpretations have been consistently embedded in the empirical material through the use of quotations from interviews, which increases the transparency and credibility of the conclusions.

4. Research results

The empirical part presents the results of a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with organizational leaders, focusing on their experiences related to motivation, compensation systems and the relationship between individual interest and the logic of the organization. The analysis shows the key mechanisms through which these experiences translate into

decision-making practices and reveal tensions present in the daily functioning of the organization.

4.1. The tension between the individual interest of the leader and the logic of the organization - the perspective of the actors

The analysis of interviews shows that management can face enormous, often morally questionable, pressure to achieve financial results, even at the expense of reporting reliability:

> [...] and let's do this EBITDA, if it didn't work out on the shopfloor, we'll do it in accounting, so don't post some reserve, don't post something there or disclose something earlier. But it comes back to haunt you later... [CFO-1]

Meeting such pressure requires a very strong moral backbone, self-confidence and courage. However, as the interlocutor convinces, it pays off in the long run:

> And they felt such a situation that there really is no room to create something in financial numbers, but you have to get down to work. And imagine that in half a year... Suddenly, this company from some average result, the result improved two and a half times [CFO-1]

In this case, the determination of the leader made the team understand that if any bonus is to be implemented in the organization, there is no other way to achieve it than through efficient action (see: Kotarbiński, 2003; Kieżun, 1977), and not manipulation of financial results.

A similar perspective, although in a completely different context, is presented by another interlocutor. He also rejects the short-term focus on financial results:

> I think of the organization as people. My goal has never been just to deliver results, but to develop people so that the organization is stronger. [CFO-2]

Both cases suggest that sustainable financial performance is built not through accounting manoeuvres, but through long-term orientation and operational improvements at its core.

A further illustration comes from a family-owned company, where personal interest is framed in broader terms than financial gain. As the respondent points out, the leader's interest also includes autonomy, the ability to realize one's own vision, and a sense of meaning and agency. As he emphasized, the key motivation is not to maximize compensation, but to make decisions:

> I do it primarily for a sense of freedom. To have the feeling that I am implementing my own ideas, not someone else's. Money is important, but it is not an end in itself. [CEO-1]

In turn, the owner and chairman of the supervisory board of a family company pointed to a strong identification of personal interest with the durability of the organization:

> Money is extremely important, this is the engine. But the goal was never money. The goal was to build a company, a structure that would last. [RN-1]

In this context, the tension between the leader's interest and the logic of the organization is not an open conflict, but rather an internal dilemma in which the leader negotiates between his own ambitions, values, and systemic constraints. Often the axis of tension is the perspective of time.

4.2. Tension between short-term and long-term orientation

Organizations, and above all leaders, operate under constant pressure from stakeholders (public opinion, investors), which is primarily focused on the short term.

> On the stock exchange, every quarter is an evaluation. This makes it very difficult to make decisions that only make sense in a few years. [RN-2]

The aforementioned pressure to "deliver" a good financial result conflicts with a long-term strategic orientation. Often, initiatives that build value in the future require expenditures that are difficult for the organization's stakeholders to accept. They may result, for example, in the non-payment of dividends. From this perspective, it seems that investors would like to eat their cake and have their cake, while the leaders have to decide how to reconcile these conflicting interests. It seems that a slightly easier task is faced by managers managing family organizations. There, long-term orientation is the main strategic goal:

> When you build a company for yourself and for your successors, you are not interested in whether the results this year are perfect. You are interested in whether the company will survive. [RN-1]

Survival gives the team a sense of security and meaning that what they are doing is worth sacrificing their private time. In this way, it can be stated that the convergence of individual goals (often private) with the goals of the organization is achieved – the interest of the individual is consistent with the logic of the organization.

4.3. Compensation systems as a source and regulator of tensions

The compensation system should support the achievement of strategic objectives as an overriding imperative. The organization's long-term vision is expected to be operationalized. In this way, compensation systems are expected to support the long-term survival of the organization. However, many companies face problems in cascading strategic goals to lower levels of the organization and to individual jobs. One of the interlocutors also points out such a problem:

> When everything tries to be closed in KPIs, people stop thinking more broadly. And intelligence and potential cannot be squeezed into a table. [CFO-2]

The above quote captures the negative effect of the over-formalization of rating and bonus systems. In such cases, the compensation system, instead of reinforcing intrinsic motivation, leads to its erosion. This observation aligns with Goodhart's Law, which states that when any indicator begins to be treated as a goal, it ceases to be a good indicator (Strathern, 1997). Especially if the reliability of the selected indicators may be questioned, if only because of the pressure described earlier. This increases the distance between the leader and the organization.

Another interlocutor also pointed to the reorientation of goals:

> People were accounted for with EBITDA, so instead of improving processes, they improved the numbers. It was only when we stopped 'correcting' the result in finances that the company began to improve in real terms. [CFO-1]

In this perspective, the bonus system becomes a tool that institutionalizes short-termism. The respondent pointed out that bonus pressure often leads to situations in which the logic of the organization is subordinated to the individual interest of the manager.

It is worth noting that the interlocutors also point out that the variability of compensation is not a problem in itself - the problem is an overly narrow definition of success, reduced to a single measure.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

This study demonstrates that tensions between leaders' self-interest and organizational logic cannot be reduced to classic principal-agent conflicts but are structural and contextual, embedded in organizational practices, monitoring systems, and dominant institutional and ownership patterns. This finding aligns with the paradox and tension perspective, which treats competing demands as a permanent feature of organizing rather than a deviation from equilibrium (Smith, Lewis, 2011; Putnam et al., 2016; Schad et al., 2016).

While the results partially support agency theory, they also challenge its simplifying assumptions. Consistent with earlier critiques, managerial interests proved to be multidimensional and extended beyond financial rewards to include autonomy, professional identity, and long-term organizational orientation (Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Bebchuk, Fried, 2003). Reducing motivation to monetary incentives therefore risks misdesigning compensation systems. In line with research on unintended consequences of performance management, incentive schemes strongly tied to short-term financial indicators intensified opportunistic behaviour through KPI gaming and goal instrumentalization (Holmström, Milgrom, 1991; Franco-Santos, Otley, 2018; Strathern, 1997).

A key contribution of the study is the empirical confirmation of intrinsic motivation as a moderator of incentive effectiveness. Leaders oriented toward organizational and human development were less susceptible to financial incentives and less prone to short-termism. This finding is consistent with self-determination theory, which suggests that excessive reliance on external controls can crowd out autonomous motivation and weaken responsibility for long-term outcomes (Ryan, Deci, 2000). Conversely, trust-based and transparent governance environments fostered stronger organizational identification, echoing research on values, authenticity, and selective engagement (Alvesson, Einola, 2019; Knoll et al., 2021).

The findings further show that compensation systems function not only as motivational devices but also as institutional mechanisms that signal which logics dominate in practice. In many cases, they reflected external pressures, particularly capital market expectations, rather than declared organizational strategies, reinforcing short-term logics even when these conflicted with long-term objectives. This observation is consistent with institutional logics research, which highlights how governance mechanisms reproduce dominant rationalities within organizational fields (Besharov, Smith, 2014; Thornton et al., 2018).

Ownership context proved to be a critical boundary condition. In private and family firms, managerial and organizational interests were more closely aligned, supporting long-term decision-making and value-based interpretation of goals. In contrast, public companies exhibited stronger short-term pressures and more pronounced tensions, a pattern also noted in Polish research on highly formalized and metric-driven organizations (Kostera, 2020; Jemielniak, 2022; Postuła, Rosiak, 2024).

Taken together, the study contributes theoretically by integrating agency theory with behavioural, institutional, and paradox perspectives on the individual-organization relationship. It shows that tensions between leaders' interests and organizational logic are not merely contractual but are embedded in systems of values, goals, and governance arrangements. From a practical standpoint, the findings point to the need to design compensation and corporate governance systems that recognize the multidimensional nature of managerial motivation, limit short-termism, align incentives with ownership logic, and ensure coherence between strategy, supervision, and everyday decision-making.

The conducted pilot study was carried out on a small sample and constitutes a preliminary step toward a broader research project investigating, among other aspects, tensions between leaders and the organization. Accordingly, the article is subject to typical limitations arising from the selected research sample as well as from the adopted qualitative research methodology. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from this study should not be generalized. Rather, they should serve as a basis and inspiration for further, more in-depth research employing both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

References

1. Alvesson, M., Einola, K. (2019). Warning for excessive positivity: Authentic leadership and other traps in leadership studies. *Journal of Management Studies*, *56*(2), 383-410. https://doi.org/10.1111/joms.12378
2. Bebchuk, L.A., Fried, J.M. (2003). Executive compensation as an agency problem. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *17*(3), 71-92. https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204362

3. Besharov, M.L., Smith, W.K. (2014). Multiple institutional logics in organizations: Explaining their varied nature and implications. *Academy of Management Review*, *39*(3), 364-381. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2011.0431
4. Deloitte (2024). *2024 Global Human Capital Trends: Thriving beyond boundaries*. Deloitte Insights.
5. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. *Academy of Management Review*, *14*(1), 57-74. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1989.4279003
6. Fairhurst, G.T., Smith, W.K., Banghart, S., Lewis, M.W., Putnam, L.L., Raisch, S., Schad, J. (2020). Diverging and converging: Integrative insights on a paradox meta-perspective. *Academy of Management Annals*, *14*(1), 173-213.
7. Franco-Santos, M., Otley, D. (2018). Reviewing and theorizing the unintended consequences of performance management systems. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, *20*(3), 696-730. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12183.
8. Gallup (2024). *State of the Global Workplace: 2024 Report*. Gallup.
9. Holmström, B., Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal–agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, *7(Special Issue),* 24-52.
10. Jemielniak, D. (2022). *Kultura współpracy*. Poltext.
11. Jemielniak, D., Pruchniewska, U. (2020). *Etyka i organizowanie. Moralne wymiary pracy menedżerskiej*. Scholar.
12. Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*, *3*(4), 305-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
13. Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. *Journal of Political Economy*, *98*(2), 225-264. https://doi.org/10.1086/261677
14. Kieżun, W. (1977). *Sprawne zarządzanie organizacją*. PWN.
15. Knoll, M., van Dick, R. (2021). Do I hear the whistle…? A first attempt to measure four forms of employee silence and their correlates. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *172*(2), 337-353.
16. Knoll, M., Hall, R.J., Weigelt, O. (2021). A longitudinal study of the relationships between organizational identification, value incongruence, and stress. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *42*(5), 587-605.
17. Kostera, M. (2020). *Organizacje i archetypy*. Wolters Kluwer.
18. Kotarbiński, T. (2003). *Traktat o dobrej robocie* (wyd. 7). Ossolineum.
19. Kreiner, G.E., Hollensbe, E.C., Sheep, M.L. (2019). Where is the "me" among the "we"? Identity work and the search for optimal balance. *Academy of Management Journal*, *52*(5), 1031-1057.
20. Kristof-Brown, A.L., Zimmerman, R.D., Johnson, E.C. (2023). Consequences of individuals' fit at work: A meta-analysis of person-job, person-organization, person-group,

and person–supervisor fit. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *10*, 483-513.

21. Microsoft & LinkedIn (2024). *2024 Work Trend Index Annual Report: AI at work is here. Now comes the hard part*. Microsoft.
22. Papachroni, A., Heracleous, L., Paroutis, S. (2016). Organizational ambidexterity through the lens of paradox theory: Building a novel research agenda. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, *52*(4), 453-478.
23. Pasieczny, J., Postuła, A., Rosiak, T. (2024). Systemic determinants of learning in public administration: A case study of phytosanitary inspection. *Scientific Papers of Silesian University of Technology. Organization and Management Series*, *202*, 461-471. https://doi.org/10.29119/1641-3466.2024.202.28
24. Postuła, A., Rosiak, T. (2024). Employee engagement in the public sector amid unstable systemic solutions. *Scientific Papers of Silesian University of Technology. Organization and Management Series*, *199*, 505-515. https://doi.org/10.29119/1641-3466.2024.199.38
25. Putnam, L.L., Fairhurst, G.T., Banghart, S. (2016). Contradictions, dialectics, and paradoxes in organizations: A constitutive approach. *The Academy of Management Annals*, *10*(1), 65-171. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2016.1162421
26. Raisch, S., Zimmermann, A. (2017). Pathways to ambidexterity: A process perspective on the exploration–exploitation paradox. *Organization Science*, *28*(4), 676-693.
27. Rosiak, T., Pasieczny, J., Postuła, A. (2024). Paradoxes in the operation of public administration: Opportunity or barrier to the sustainable development of organisations? *Administratie si Management Public*, *43*, 172-183. https://doi.org/10.24818/amp/2024.43-10
28. Ryan, R.M., Deci, E.L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. *American Psychologist*, *55*(1), 68-78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68
29. Schad, J., Lewis, M.W., Raisch, S., Smith, W.K. (2016). Paradox research in management science: Looking back to move forward. *The Academy of Management Annals, 10(1),* 5-64. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2016.1162422
30. Schad, J., Smith, W.K., Lewis, M.W. (2022). The dynamics of paradoxical tensions: A multilevel perspective. *Organization Studies, 43*(8), 1141-1166.
31. Smith, W.K., Lewis, M.W. (2011). Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic equilibrium model of organizing. *Academy of Management Review, 36(2),* 381-403. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2009.0223
32. Smith, W.K., Tracey, P. (2016). Institutional complexity and paradox theory: Complementarities of competing demands. *Strategic Organization*, *14*(4), 455-466.
33. Strathern, M. (1997). 'Improving ratings': Audit in the British University system. *European Review*, *5*(3), 305-321.

34. Thornton, P.H., Ocasio, W., Lounsbury, M. (2018). *The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process*. Oxford University Press.
35. Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., Obstfeld, D. (2005). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. *Organization Science*, *16*(4), 409-421. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1050.0133
36. Weick, K.E., Sutcliffe, K.M., Obstfeld, D. (2021). Organizing and the process of sensemaking. *Organization Studies*, *42*(3), 475-497.