

## POTENTIAL CONFLICTS IN CAPITAL GROUPS – RESEARCH RESULTS

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**Purpose:** The main purpose of the article is to present a portion of the author's empirical research on the functioning, relationships, and negotiations within capital groups, as well as to discuss the identified areas of potential conflicts between companies in the group and their sources.

**Design/methodology/approach:** The research was conducted among CEOs, board members, and directors of the dominant entities in the largest capital groups in Poland. The survey involved 119 respondents from 49 capital groups, and in addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with 5 CEOs from the groups participating in the survey.

**Findings:** The identified areas of potential conflicts in capital groups reflect the deep organizational structure arising from the relationships and connections between the participants of these organizations. Conflicts emerge as an integral part of the dynamic ecosystem of capital groups. The research revealed a clear correlation between organizational structure and the sources of conflict, which include improper resource allocation, lack of clear communication, conflicting strategic goals, and the diversity of organizational cultures between companies. It was indicated that these conflicts significantly affect the performance and efficiency of capital groups. Therefore, it is essential to introduce conflict management mechanisms, open communication, and the harmonization of goals and values across all companies in the group. Building a shared organizational culture is a key element in minimizing conflicts.

**Research limitations/implications:** The study on conflicts in capital groups indicates that the organizational structure and capital connections significantly impact the occurrence of internal conflicts. Therefore, future research should focus on a more detailed understanding of these connections and their influence on the dynamics of conflicts. It is also important to examine how differences in organizational culture, management styles, and strategic goals affect negotiations and cooperation between companies within capital groups. Expanding the analysis to include aspects related to communication and resource management will allow for the development of more precise conflict minimization strategies. Moreover, it is worth considering comparative studies with other countries or sectors to gain a broader context for the functioning of capital groups and to verify the findings in different economic conditions.

**Practical implications:** The research results indicate the need for the implementation of consistent conflict management mechanisms in capital groups. To minimize tensions and increase cooperation efficiency, capital groups should develop communication platforms that enable the open exchange of information between companies and support knowledge sharing. The introduction of mediation, negotiation, and arbitration mechanisms can significantly assist in resolving disputes, especially in the context of differences in organizational culture or

strategic goals among the companies in the group. It is also crucial to build a common organizational culture that fosters synergy and understanding between companies, which can lead to more effective cooperation and better resource management. Developing an internal negotiation model (which the author is working on), based on an understanding of the specifics of capital groups, may help integrate goals and actions, ultimately increasing operational cohesion and the overall stability of the group.

**Social implications:** The study highlights that conflict management in capital groups has significant social implications, as it affects relationships and cooperation between companies and employees. Creating an open and transparent communication system and building a common organizational culture can foster mutual understanding and the integration of employees from different companies within the group. The implementation of mediation and negotiation mechanisms contributes to creating a friendly and fair working environment, which increases employee satisfaction and minimizes the risk of conflict escalation. Effective management of diversity and conflicts can also positively impact job stability and the development of employees within capital groups.

**Originality/value:** The originality of the article lies in the detailed description of the main areas of conflicts in Polish capital groups and their sources, based on the author's research. It analyzes how the organizational structure and capital connections influence the occurrence of internal conflicts. Presenting these areas in the context of relationships between companies allows for a better understanding of the dynamics and causes of conflicts, constituting a unique contribution to the literature on capital group management. The value of the article lies in combining these analyses with practical recommendations that can support effective management of internal relationships and negotiations.

**Keywords:** capital group, conflicts, goals, connections, internal relations.

**Category of the paper:** Research paper.

## 1. Introduction

The contemporary business environment is characterized by increasing complexity and intense competition, which forces companies to seek innovative organizational strategies aimed at maintaining their market position and achieving lasting success. In this context, the formation of capital groups is a significant phenomenon multi-entity organizational structures that are a fundamental element of today's economy. Capital groups are advanced organizational models consisting of a dominant controlling entity and subsidiaries clustered around it. They represent a complex network of companies whose operations are based on shared oversight and management, as well as strong capital ties.

It is worth emphasizing that, despite belonging to the group, companies retain their legal independence, pursuing individual goals and striving for further development. However, participation in a capital group involves certain limitations that affect the autonomy of the companies. Strategic and operational decisions are often dependent on the approval of the dominant entity, which can restrict the freedom of action of the subsidiaries and lead to divergences in short- and long-term goals and perspectives, potentially generating conflicts. Nonetheless, the key value of capital groups is their ability to generate synergy through

cooperation between subsidiaries. This synergy results from the utilization of complementary competencies, shared resources, knowledge, and process optimization, which ultimately contributes to operational efficiency and increased competitiveness in the market.

The purpose of this article is to present the results of the author's research on the functioning, relationships, and negotiations within Polish capital groups. The survey, conducted between 2022 and 2023, involved 119 respondents from 49 capital groups, including CEOs, board members, and directors of the dominant entities in the largest Polish groups. Additionally, in-depth interviews were conducted with the CEOs of the groups to further explore selected aspects and gain deeper insights into the management strategies of these capital groups. An additional goal is to analyze and present the identified key areas of potential conflicts between companies within the group.

The article begins with a review of theoretical concepts, addressing the essence, formation, functions, and objectives of capital groups. Next, in relation to the researched topic, four main types of connections characteristic of capital groups are discussed. Finally, the results of the empirical research are presented, along with a detailed analysis of the identified areas of potential conflicts within capital groups.

## 2. Capital Group: Essence, Formation, Objectives, Types, and Functions

A capital group is a complex organizational structure comprising multiple business entities operating under common supervision and management, where capital connections between them are the key feature. However, there are discrepancies in the literature regarding the definition of a capital group, particularly in the context of the specificity of Polish capital groups. Therefore, Table 1 presents selected definitions of this concept from the literature.

From the perspective of this article, it is important to emphasize that companies within a capital group retain their legal independence, pursuing their own goals and striving for further development. However, this structure can lead to potential conflicts stemming from differences in opinions or the short-term goals of individual entities.

**Table 1.**  
*Selected definitions of capital groups*

Author	Definition
<b>Trocki (2004)</b>	A structure connecting a set of legally independent economic entities, created to achieve common economic goals and implementing them based on connections between entities.
<b>Aluchna (2010)</b>	A capital group consisting of independent entities (companies), connected mainly by capital ties (and other supplementary connections), created to achieve common economic goals based on the type and intensity of links between them.
<b>Legerska, Bańczak (2004)</b>	A grouping of companies formed for the common realization of economic goals, aimed at achieving economic benefits that could not be attained individually.

Source: own elaboration based on the literature.

A central aspect of the functioning of a capital group is the ability to achieve synergy through cooperation between subsidiaries. This synergy results from the use of complementary competencies, sharing of resources and knowledge, and optimization of business processes. As a result, this leads to increased operational efficiency and strengthens the competitive position in the market (Romanowska, 2011; Chadam, 2006, 2012).

The formation of capital groups can occur in various ways. A common strategy is mergers and acquisitions, where existing companies are combined under common management, allowing for a rapid increase in scale and achieving synergy effects (Grobely, 2018; Łojek, Toborek-Mazur, 2022; You, Lu, Hoskisson, 2007). Alternatively, a capital group can be formed by creating new subsidiaries, which allows entry into new markets or diversification of operations, minimizing the risks associated with direct investments in unfamiliar areas. Another mechanism involves strategic alliances and joint ventures, enabling collaboration with other entities without the need for full capital integration.

The objectives of forming capital groups are diverse and encompass a wide range of business strategies. The fundamental goal is to achieve synergy, manifested in increasing the value of the enterprise through harmonization of activities and cooperation between subsidiaries (Sari, Rokhmania, 2020; Van Knippenberg, Nishii, Dwertmann, 2020; Tippmann et al., 2018). Through the shared use of resources, elimination of redundant activities, and mutual support, a capital group can gain benefits unavailable to individual, independent entities (Grabiec, 2011). Additionally, capital groups often aim for market expansion by broadening their product offerings or entering new geographic markets. Financial goals, such as optimizing capital structure, increasing tax efficiency, and generating financial synergies between entities within the group, are also crucial.

The classification of capital groups can be based on various criteria, such as ownership structure, scope of activities, or degree of integration. Based on ownership structure, holding groups can be distinguished, where the parent company holds controlling stakes in subsidiaries, as well as conglomerate groups, combining entities operating in different industries without clear operational links. In terms of the degree of integration, capital groups can be loosely structured, with a low level of centralization, or highly integrated, where strategic decisions are made at the central level (Mahmood, Zhu, Zaheer, 2017).

The functions performed by capital groups are multidimensional and include strategic, operational, and financial aspects:

- **Control function:** exerting influence on the decisions of subsidiaries through participation in their management bodies or ownership of majority shareholdings.
- **Coordination function:** harmonizing operational activities, standardizing processes, and implementing common marketing or technological strategies.
- **Financial function:** managing financial flows within the group, optimizing debt structure, and leveraging economies of scale in negotiations with financial institutions.

- **Management function:** focusing on the effective use of human resources, knowledge transfer, and best practices between companies, as well as building an organizational culture that fosters innovation and development.

In summary, a capital group represents a complex organizational model that enables effective management and utilization of the potential of various business entities. Its essence lies in achieving synergy between subsidiaries, and the formation of a group can result from mergers, acquisitions, or the creation of new companies (Zajac, 2010). The goals of capital groups include striving for synergy, market expansion, and achieving financial objectives. Depending on the ownership structure and the nature of relationships between companies, capital groups can take on different forms. They perform various functions, such as control, coordination, financing, and resource management. In the face of dynamically changing market conditions, capital groups play a key role in corporate strategies, enabling enterprises to gain a competitive advantage through the effective utilization of the entire group's potential.

### 3. Connections in Capital Groups

In a unified enterprise, operations are based on a set of complex and interconnected organizational relationships that enable the achievement of harmony in activities. However, in the case of multi-entity structures, such as capital groups, which are characterized by increased complexity and diversity of elements, more elaborate and well-thought-out connections between companies and divisions are required to ensure effective management and the realization of set objectives (Kotłowska, 2015; Schmid, Maurer, 2008).


For the purposes of this article, further analysis will focus on the fundamental and primary formal connections most frequently cited in research on capital group theory, namely capital, personal, asset, and contractual connections (Mierzejewska, 2020).

**Table 2.**  
*Characteristics of Connections in a Capital Group*

Type of connection	Characteristics
<b>Capital</b>	A constitutive feature, sometimes referred to as institutional connection; the intensity of this connection depends on the shareholdings or equity held by the parent company.
<b>Asset</b>	Supplementary ties, most commonly formed during the creation of the group; involve using the assets of one entity for the operational activities of another company. This applies to all types of assets.
<b>Contractual</b>	Supplementary ties based on cooperation and resource exchange between participants in capital groups within the internal market; they introduce the equality of entities based on agreements and are verified by criteria derived from the contract.
<b>Personal</b>	Supplementary ties that extend capital connections; they strengthen internal integration by combining the roles of individuals in high-level positions (e.g., in the Management Board or Supervisory Board) simultaneously in different companies within the group.

Source: Own elaboration based on the literature.

A key element, and at the same time a constitutive feature of the structure of capital groups, are capital ties, which significantly influence the formation of their character and functioning. It is through these ties that it becomes possible to classify individual companies as components of a given group. The diversity of capital connections, encompassing unilateral, reciprocal, one-tier, and multi-tier forms, allows for the direction of relationships depending on the level of engagement and the shares held by specific entities, as illustrated in Figure 1. The concept of the intensity of capital connections, based on the size of shareholdings or equity, indicates that the higher the ownership stake, the greater the ability to influence the decision-making and management processes of the companies, which translates into control over their operations.



**Figure 1.** Connections in Capital Groups.

Source: Own elaboration based on the literature.

In the face of dynamic market changes, capital groups go beyond the realm of capital connections and employ various forms of relationships to increase efficiency and operational flexibility. One such mechanism is asset connections, which play a crucial role by enabling the sharing of material resources such as real estate, equipment, or trademark rights. An example of this would be a parent company transferring or leasing part of its assets to a subsidiary to carry out specific operational activities. These ties strengthen cooperation and enable the synergistic use of resources among companies within the group (Bengtsson, Kock, 1999).

Contractual connections are another important element of the complex network of relationships within capital groups. These are based on contractual relationships in which the parties agree on the terms of cooperation, covering aspects such as deliveries, services, or knowledge transfer. Notably, these ties are based on equality, which translates into the efficiency of their functioning. Contractual connections facilitate the development of coherent operational mechanisms, minimizing potential conflicts of interest between companies.

In the context of personal connections, their role in managing capital groups is increasingly recognized. Personal relationships go beyond traditional models of cooperation, influencing decisions at both the ownership and operational levels. Including individuals who manage different companies within the group in the supervisory and management bodies of other entities creates a network of relationships that can accelerate information flow, increase efficiency, and reduce costs. Additionally, this leads to greater control over companies' decisions. However, there is a risk that over-engagement of one person in multiple governing bodies may lead to a dilution of responsibility or a conflict of interest.

In summary, personal, capital, asset, and contractual connections form the foundation of the complex relationship structure within capital groups. These diverse ties influence the functioning of the group, enabling the achievement of efficiency and the realization of strategic objectives. They affect decision-making processes, resource allocation, and the development of synergies between companies within the group (Trocki, 2004). It is essential, however, to understand that these connections can be modified depending on changing market conditions or the strategic goals of the capital group, and they influence the operational activities of each company.

#### **4. Research Methodology and Characteristics of the Research Sample**

The empirical research presented in this article is part of a broader research project conducted by the author since 2021, focusing on the functioning and relationships between companies within Polish capital groups, as well as internal negotiations. The purpose of this research was to gain insight and analyze these areas in both the private and public sectors, providing a comprehensive picture of the functioning of capital groups in Poland.

The research was conducted among the top management of dominant companies (CEOs, directors), as these entities are responsible for creating and overseeing internal processes within capital groups. Additionally, these individuals often serve on the boards or supervisory councils of subsidiary companies, allowing them to influence strategic decisions across the entire group.

The survey involved 119 respondents representing 49 capital groups. In line with the research design, the invitation to participate was extended to all capital groups overseen by the Ministry of State Assets, as well as the largest private conglomerates, selected deliberately. Due to the nature of the research and the involvement of key and prominent individuals in their respective industries, participants were given the option to complete the survey in the format most convenient for them, either in paper or electronic form.

**Table 3.**  
*Characteristics of Participants and Research Groups*

Category	Option	Percentage of respondents
Position	<i>Board Member</i>	33.6%
	<i>Department Director</i>	28.6%
	<i>CEO</i>	24.4%
	<i>Division Director</i>	13.4%
Ownership	<i>State-owned</i>	61.3%
	<i>Private</i>	38.7%
Sector	<i>Industrial</i>	52.0%
	<i>Services</i>	46.1%
	<i>Agricultural</i>	1.9%
Group Objective	<i>Maximizing benefits, minimizing risk</i>	51.3%
	<i>Synergy between companies</i>	47.0%
	<i>Strengthening the dominant company</i>	1.7%
Group Size	<i>Small</i>	22.7%
	<i>Medium</i>	29.4%
	<i>Large</i>	49.9%
Group Structure	<i>Strong ties, formalization, centralization, hierarchy</i>	51.3%
	<i>Mixed</i>	26.0%
	<i>Strong ties, high autonomy</i>	21.0%
	<i>Loose structure, low standardization, high autonomy, diverse specialties</i>	1.7%

Source: Own elaboration based on the research.

The analysis of the presented data indicates that representatives of capital groups from all sectors of the economy industrial, service, and agricultural participated in the study, providing a broad industry perspective. Respondents represented both state-owned enterprises (61.3%) and private enterprises (38.7%), allowing for a comparison of different ownership models and their impact on the functioning of capital groups.

In terms of organizational structure, the surveyed groups were diverse: ranging from highly formalized and centralized structures with a hierarchical management model (51.3%), through mixed structures (26.0%), to groups characterized by a high degree of autonomy for subsidiaries (21.0%) and loosely structured groups with low standardization (1.7%). This diversity allows for a holistic view of management mechanisms and internal relationships within capital groups with different organizational models.

The dominant goal of the surveyed groups was maximizing benefits and minimizing risk (51.3%), which indicates a strong focus on economic efficiency and financial stability. A significant portion of the groups (47.0%) focused on achieving synergy between companies, emphasizing the importance of cooperation and the integration of activities. A small number of groups (1.7%) identified strengthening the dominant company's operations as their main objective, which may reflect a strategy of centralization and resource concentration.

The size of the surveyed capital groups varied: large groups constituted 49.9% of the sample, medium-sized groups 29.4%, and small groups 22.7%. This allows for an analysis of the impact of scale on the functioning of capital groups, including managing intercompany relationships and the efficiency of decision-making processes. The participation of top management in the study provides valuable insights into management strategies, organizational



culture, and the challenges associated with coordinating activities within capital groups. Their perspective allows for an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms influencing the effectiveness of the groups and the identification of areas in need of improvement.

Following the analysis of the survey results, in-depth interviews were conducted with five CEOs who also participated in the initial survey. The aim was to deepen understanding of specific aspects, learn about their approach to the identified areas, and gain a more detailed view of group management strategy. The interviewees included three CEOs from groups overseen by the Ministry of State Assets and two from the private sector. The interviews took place during personal meetings and were not recorded due to confidentiality and other reasons specified by the participants.

In summary, the diversity of the surveyed sample in terms of sector, ownership, group size, and organizational structure enables a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of Polish capital groups. The research results can serve as a valuable foundation for formulating recommendations for managers and policymakers regarding the optimization of capital group management and improving their competitiveness in the market.


Moreover, an analysis of the differences between state-owned and private groups can contribute to a better understanding of the specificities of these entities and the identification of best practices in corporate governance, resource management, and achieving strategic goals. In the context of dynamic economic changes and increasing competition, such research is crucial for developing effective business models and strengthening the position of Polish capital groups on the international stage.

## **5. Results**

The first and main aspect of the study on the divergence of interests and potential conflicts in capital groups was the analysis of respondents' answers to three similarly formulated questions:

1. During mutual agreements between companies within the same capital group, the primary concern is the interests (benefits) of the individual company.
2. During mutual agreements between companies within the same capital group, the primary concern is the interests (benefits) of both parties.
3. During mutual agreements between companies within the same capital group, the primary concern is the interests (benefits) of the entire group.

Respondents could answer these closed questions by selecting YES, NO, or DON'T KNOW. The detailed results are presented in Figure 2.



**Figure 2.** Interests and Benefits – Results.


Source: Own elaboration based on research results.

The results indicate that the study participants understand both the importance of individual company interests and the need for cooperation and achieving the common goals of the capital group. However, this can lead to misunderstandings during operational work. Priority for individual company interests: The vast majority of respondents (73.0%) believe that the priority during negotiations should be the interests of individual companies. This may suggest a strong tendency to protect the competitiveness and performance of their own company, even at the expense of other entities within the group. Mutual benefits for both parties: In response to the question about the interests of both parties, 46.0% of respondents consider it crucial to strive for benefits for all companies involved in the process. This reflects an understanding and acceptance of the need for balance between companies within the group. Priority for group interests: The results show that a high percentage of respondents (70.0%) regard the interests of the entire capital group as the most important during negotiations. This suggests a belief in the benefits of harmony, synergy, and cooperation within the group. However, the diversity of preferences and priorities within a capital group may lead to potential conflicts, as confirmed by the study results. Establishing a primary priority can become problematic due to differences in the goals, values, and expectations of individual companies and participants in the group. In the further stages of the survey, several questions were asked regarding functioning, autonomy, relationships, decision-making, and hierarchy within the organization. Based on the results and the author's own analysis, several examples of divergent approaches among companies in the group were identified:

- **Goal divergence:** When different companies within the group pursue different objectives, for example, one focusing on short-term profits while another aims for long-term stability, it can lead to conflicts related to resource allocation and strategic decision-making.

- **Inequality:** If some companies benefit more from specific activities or projects, others may feel overlooked or neglected, leading to a sense of injustice and conflict.
- **Lack of understanding:** When some companies fail to understand or appreciate the goals and needs of other companies, it can lead to poor communication and misunderstandings, generating conflicts.
- **Differences in approach:** Companies may have different approaches to management, risk, investment, or human resources. These differences can lead to difficulties in coordinating common actions and making decisions, which can generate conflicts.
- **Limited resources:** Competition for limited resources, such as finances, personnel, or technologies, can generate conflicts, especially if there is no clear strategy for allocation and priorities.
- **Organizational culture:** Differences in organizational culture, values, and management styles between companies can lead to conflicts in the areas of communication, cooperation, and decision-making.
- **Internal competition:** Internal competition for recognition, prestige, or influence within the group can lead to interpersonal conflicts and discourage cooperation.

After analyzing and synthesizing the results, the author identified four main areas of potential conflict, presented in **Figure 3**.



**Figure 3.** Main Areas of Conflict.

The first area (relations) was described based on respondents' answers to the following questions, among others:

1. Do the companies in the group maintain a relationship?
2. What kind of relationship between companies (cooperation, coopetition, competition) occurs most often?
3. Are the companies bound by SLA agreements?
4. What types of relationships are the most important?

The results indicate that the majority of companies are related, primarily within business lines or segments (approximately 60%). One in three respondents indicated that all companies are in some form of relationship. Cooperation dominates (63%), followed by cooptation (35%), with only a few companies competing with each other. A large proportion of companies are also bound by agreements that allow for the evaluation and implementation of cooperation based on objective criteria.

In the next area (autonomy), the companies' ability to decide on their relationships with internal and external partners was examined. The following questions were asked, among others:

1. Can companies freely choose partners for cooperation?
2. Can they withdraw from negotiations with a group company and establish external relationships?
3. How does the dominant entity influence and control subsidiary companies?

It turned out that in almost half of the cases (about 53%), such freedom exists, but the organization prefers internal relationships. Establishing external relationships requires corporate approval from the dominant entity. One in five respondents indicated that a company cannot freely choose its partners. The situation is similar in negotiations, where a company can break off negotiations but requires the approval of the dominant entity (approximately 65%).

The source of conflicts identified as hierarchy was described based on respondents' answers to questions such as:

1. Are the companies equal to one another?
2. Do companies have full access to information within the group?
3. Are the companies in any way divided, e.g., into strategic companies and supporting companies?

The results suggest that most capital groups have a hierarchy (formal or informal), confirmed by nearly 90% of the responses. Only one in ten respondents stated that all companies are equal. More than half believe that companies do not have equal access to all necessary information.

The last group of potential conflicts is the area of decision-making within the group. The following questions were asked, among others:

1. Who makes the key decisions regarding the group?
2. Who makes decisions during negotiations between group companies?
3. In which areas do companies need corporate approvals?

Almost half of the survey participants stated that the dominant entity alone makes decisions on the most important matters concerning the group. Only one in four respondents indicated that decisions are made collectively or by the companies most involved in the issue. In one-third of the negotiations where the parties are group companies, the final decision is made by the parent company. In other cases, the boards of the subsidiary companies decide.

The most important areas requiring corporate approvals include finances, procurement, senior management appointments, investments, and asset management.

All the above research areas were re-verified during in-depth interviews, which enabled a more detailed and comprehensive picture of the discussed aspects. The interviews allowed for a deeper exploration of the respondents' motivations and perspectives, which, in turn, contributed to a better understanding and clarification of the key areas of conflict in capital groups. This made it possible to more accurately identify mechanisms and dependencies between individual companies and their impact on the functioning of the entire group.

## 6. Conclusions

The identified and discussed areas of potential conflicts within capital groups reflect the deep organizational structure arising from the relationships and connections between participants in these structures. These conflicts form an integral part of the dynamic ecosystem of capital groups, underscoring the need to understand differences between companies and to develop effective conflict management mechanisms as well as negotiation skills (Kochan, Huber, Cummings, 1975; Mayer, 2000; Sanders, Mobus, 2021).

The analysis of research results revealed a clear correlation between organizational structure and sources of conflicts, which include, among others, improper resource allocation, lack of clear communication, conflicting strategic goals, and cultural diversity between companies. Understanding these causes enables the identification of areas most prone to conflict and the development of preventive strategies.

These conflicts have a significant impact on the overall performance and efficiency of capital groups. Eliminating their negative effects requires the implementation of open and transparent communication and the introduction of mechanisms supporting dispute resolution, the harmonization of goals, and the values of companies within the group. Building a common organizational culture that strengthens ties and mutual understanding is also key to minimizing tensions and conflicts.

Furthermore, the importance of transparency in the decision-making process should be emphasized as a critical factor in improving cooperation within capital groups. Openness in decision-making processes and the introduction of communication platforms that promote the free flow of information can significantly reduce the risk of misunderstandings and conflicts.

Additionally, attention should be given to the importance of education in negotiations. Developing negotiation competencies among managers within capital groups could contribute to more effective management of internal relationships and the reduction of potential conflicts.

The research findings confirm the validity of the author's work on the model of internal negotiations within capital groups, which may serve as an effective tool supporting the integration of goals and strengthening the position of the group.

In conclusion, the research results provide valuable insights into potential areas of conflict and their sources, while also offering a solid foundation for developing management strategies and making decisions in the context of negotiations, strategic planning, and goal achievement in capital groups. The adoption of the proposed conclusions could contribute to creating an effective operational model for capital groups that minimizes conflicts and supports the achievement of consistent organizational outcomes.

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