

HUMAN RIGHTS – SUSTAINABILITY – CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PART III: SOME REMARKS ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Abstract: The paper is a part of a series of articles devoted to the relations among three important ideas co-shaping contemporary global world: human rights, sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). It presents the historical context of the emergence of CSR and discusses some theoretical issues related to this concept.

Keywords: business ethics, corporation, corporate social responsibility, stakeholders, law, morality.

Introduction

As emphasised in the two previous papers, we live in the time of globalisation. According to widespread and well-grounded opinion, the development of corporations is an important element of this process. The emergence and development of the concept of corporate social responsibility is a consequence of (or reaction to) this process. Approximately two decades after the emergence of the idea CSR, the concept of “stakeholder” (invented in 1963) started to gain popularity. This concept seems to be very useful for succinct formulation of main ideas of CSR. It also helps to explain the relations between the idea of CSR and that of sustainable development. Since the latter idea can be (as I tried to argument in the previous paper) regarded as concretisation of the idea of human rights, thus the concept of “stakeholder” can help us to implement these three important ideas of our times.

Using the concept of “stakeholder,” the main idea of this paper one could express as follows: in the time of globalisation, sustainable development is possible only if all humans are regarded as stakeholders of all organisations (profit-oriented and non-profit). An important role of the theory of CSR is to precise this thesis, to argument in favour of it, and to popularise it.

2. CSR in a historical perspective

Generally, two interrelated, though autonomous, problems could be discussed here. One of them belongs to the economic (and legal) history. It is the problem of the genesis and evolution of corporation as an economic and legal phenomenon. The other problem belongs to the history of ideas (of culture – in the very broad sense of the word). I should start with the economic and legal history. Three points should be stressed here. Firstly, the development of companies is a part of the rise of modern times: first companies were established in the lifetime of F. Bacon (1561-1626), G. Galilei (1564-1642) and R. Descartes (1596-1650). Secondly, these companies – Dutch and English – were involved in world trade; their activity can be viewed as belonging to the first “wave” of globalisation and to the history of mercantile (merchant) capitalism. Thirdly, these companies constituted great organisation of not only economic, but also military and political character.

From the legal point of view, the development of companies was based upon discretionary decisions of royal (or other) authorities. In this respect, profound changes were brought about by the first industrial revolution. As might be expected, the important developments took place in England in the mid-19th century. Germany, at the end of the age, contributed to the development of the law governing corporations as well. The main results of these processes may be defined as follows: 1) introduction of the concept of share and shareholder, and related (and very important) legal notion of limited liability; 2) adoption of the old Roman idea of “legal person” (that can sue and be sued). This idea was developed – in particularly interesting way (in the context of this series of articles) – in the U.S. law: corporations can be not only legally responsible for violations of human rights but they themselves can execute human rights against the state and even against the real (natural) persons.

Regardless of what we think about corporations, one fact seems to be beyond any serious discussion: corporations fundamentally contributed to the development of railways (and thus, indirectly, to many other – economic, political and military – processes), and – to the development to two interrelated industries: oil industry and automotive industry.

It is interesting that already at the end of 19th century, negative aspects (limitation of competition, increase in prices, etc.) of this process were noticed and some measures were taken to eliminate them. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the first and probably the most famous instance of these efforts.

Skipping over a few decades, the Great Depression (1929-1933) should be mentioned. This significant historical event is interesting to mention here for three reasons. Firstly, it demonstrated in a dramatic (and for many individuals – tragic) way the strong links between corporation and stock exchange. Secondly, it changed attitudes of many people towards corporation (and – to a degree – towards capitalism as such, which was epitomised by corporations). Thirdly, it also changed (to a degree) the attitudes towards government

interventions into economy (economic interventionism). The last tendency was strengthened by the requirements resulting from the World War II.

I want to share also some information about the history of ideas. Speaking of the history of the economy-morality relations, we should start from the very old times, i.e. – as almost always – from Greeks, in particular Aristotle. However, perhaps more important is the history of religions. Probably all religions (at least the major ones) control – in this or that way – not only sexual but also economic activity. Hence, it is not incidental that the first fundamental work concerning economy – A. Smith's (1723-1790) "The Wealth of Nations" was published approx. twenty years after the first volume of the French "Encyclopedia" – the great work of the European Enlightenment (which started in Europe as a result of the process of secularisation), and thirteen years before the French Revolution of 1789 – that is in 1776. Interestingly, this manifesto of the (then "adolescent") market economy (also capitalism?) was published approx. only two decades before early socialist (communist) ideas were formulated by F. Babeuf (1760-1797) and H. Saint-Simon (1760-1825). The last remark has been inspired by R.C. Solomon, a contemporary ethicist, who contends that it was socialists who, criticising profit-oriented thinking, contributed to the development of business ethics. Surely, the history of various forms of anti-capitalism (or – more generally – of various forms of criticism of capitalism) cannot be neglected in the case of writing a systematic history of the attitudes towards business. Nevertheless, it is a subject for a separate text. Remembering this remark, we should return to the World War II.

In the year when the USA was attacked by Japan (1941), a once famous book of J. Burnham (1905-1987), "The Managerial Revolution," was published. It can be regarded as a complement to the very important (and still read today) book of A. Berle (1895-1971) and G. Means (1886-1988) – "The Modern Corporation and Private Property" (1932). Both these books drew attention of greater audience to profound changes in the structure and mechanism of contemporary capitalism. They shed light on main element of these changes – corporation. The words of the Republican U.S. President D. Eisenhower (1890-1969) may be regarded as symbolic for mixed attitudes evoked by these changes: in his farewell address to the nation, he was warning citizens of the dangers that might result from the growing power of military-industrial complex.

According to already quoted R.S. Solomon (but many other experts share this opinion), business ethics started to develop in the early 1960's (Solomon, 2000) and it was not incidental. On the one hand, general changes in (academic) ethics involved: diminishing interest in meta-ethics and growing interest in practical (or applied) ethics. On the other hand, the cultural changes that culminated in 1968 (see previous paper) and the development of new social movements played an important role. Some of these movements were already mentioned. Some should be added to the list, particularly in the context of considerations on corporations. I think here about the consumer protection movement. In its development, particularly

important role was played by R. Nader (1934-), the author of “Unsafe at Any Speed” (1965), a book in which American automobile manufacturers were criticised¹.

When it comes to the early history of CSR, I will quote the image presented by R.T. DeGeorge who has been a leading figure in American business ethics for last few decades: “The term ‘corporate social responsibility’ or CSR has become the favorite term both of many corporate critics and of many within corporation (*sic!* – B. P.-Cz.). The term became popular in the 1960s and has remained a term used indiscriminately by many to cover legal and moral responsibility as well social responsibility more narrowly construed. (...) The term as developed in the 1960s came to be used by business in response to charges (*sic!* – B. P.-Cz.) made against it by environmentalists, consumer activists, and those who protested the ‘military-industrial complex’ involved in the Vietnam War” (DeGeorge). We should note analogy with the Solomon’s remark on the “provocative” role of socialism in the development of business ethics.

3. CSR – some theoretical remarks

Since the ancient times, both epistemology and ethics have been dominated by the individualistic perspective: both epistemic/knowing subject and moral / acting one have been regarded as more or less abstract models of an individual. The idea of collective subject (in other words, the idea of subjectivity of social groups) started to be noted in the 19th century. However, some serious work to develop this idea has been done only very recently (the last two or three decades). Therefore, a great number of issues remain completely open. Nevertheless, the discussion of the idea of CSR, thus of the moral responsibility of (business) organisation, is impossible without (explicit or only implicit) accepting some ideas concerning the collective subjectivity. In order to overcome this difficulty, I will avail of the supposed analogies between individual and collective subject.

In particular, I am going to use some intuitions collected during long debates among various types of individualisms and collectivism. The choice between individualism and collectivism, to some extent, is a fundamental moral choice (of Sartrean type), and little, if whatever, can be said to justify this or that choice. However, on the other hand, we can take some lessons from the history and maintain that neither (hypothetical) extreme individualism nor (also hypothetical) extreme collectivism can be practiced for a longer time. It seems that there are two “thresholds”: the “threshold” of minimal order and the one of minimal individual liberty. If a society goes beyond one of these “thresholds,” its further existence (even physical) is endangered.

¹ This book is said to have played a real positive role in making American cars more safe.

Whole humanity and individual societies can be modelled as complex systems, i.e. systems composed of some sub-systems (such as religion, technology, economy etc.). It seems possible to think about autonomy of a sub-system as a concept analogous to that of individual liberty. If this analogy is (as I suppose) valid, then we could introduce the concepts of the “thresholds” of minimal and maximal autonomy of sub-systems, Let’s assume that these “thresholds” have been defined. Three important theses could be formulated then: 1) the ‘thresholds’ depend on time and space (in a society, the minimal “threshold” can be located lower – on a scale – than in another society); 2) in some societies, the distance between the “thresholds” can be larger, in some others – smaller. One might be said that this distance defines the freedom of the society to decide whether it should be more or less “strictly organised.” It should be stressed that this distance is determined by some external factors (such as: the state of natural environment, demography, disposable technology, knowledge, etc.); 3) the debate on the problem – objectively possible (located between the lower and the upper “threshold”) to live with, would be of normative (moral, ideological, etc.) nature.

These very general/philosophical considerations will be applied to the discussion on the notion of “stakeholder.” Although this term was introduced by Stanford Research Institute already in 1963, it was theoretically elaborated and popularised by American researcher R.E. Freeman (1951-) in his book “Strategic Management. A Stakeholder Approach” (1984). We should take a look at the first part of the title: very standard. This impression is confirmed if we read that “the changes have occurred in the external environment of business which necessitate changes in the way that executives think about their organizations and their jobs (...) shifts in traditional relationships with external groups such as suppliers, customers, owners and employees, as well as the emergence and renewed importance of government, foreign competition, environmentalists consumer advocates, special interests groups, media and others, mean that new conceptual approach is needed” (Freeman).

In his book, Freeman suggests no radical changes in the way business is made. Nonetheless, as now it is well-known, even very small changes can initiate far-reaching transformations. In my opinion, it has been so with the idea of “stakeholder,” that has gained (perhaps at variance with Freeman’s intentions) broader connotations than it had at its beginning. It also gained some popularity beyond the limits of business organisations. For instance, the UN Division for Sustainable Development Goals (DSDG) defines some ten groups defined as its stakeholders (the disabled, farmers, etc.).

In my opinion, there are important similarities between some ideas expressed with the term “stockholder” and those which expresses the term “sustainable development”². Both terms assume that human actions have many different, often unintended, consequences. Some of them – very serious ones, affecting negatively interests of the others or influencing negatively

² Let’s note the temporal correlation: 1984 – “stakeholders”, 1987 – “sustainable development”.

material environment. Therefore, it is our moral duty to be aware of possible consequences (even distant) and draw upon this knowledge while undertaking our actions.

Similarities, even important, do not exclude serious differences: the idea of “stakeholders” has rather “local” character, and the one of “sustainable development” – rather global. Taking into account both similarities and differences, we could say that these two notions are complementary.

How we could now define the central idea of CSR? It seems that it could be formulated in the following way: business organisation, while making its decisions, should take into account – as much as possible – the interests of its stockholders. The group of stakeholders should be defined as broadly as possible – in a sense that all people should be viewed as stakeholders³. To avoid theoretical, and – first of all – practical difficulties, a measure of distance (between organisation and its stakeholders) should be introduced: some should be regarded as “very close/direct,” while others as “very distant/indirect”. However, this might be possible only after (at least partial) mathematisation of the stakeholder theory.

It might be noted that so conceived idea of CSR can be regarded as reformulation of the Christian idea of universal brotherhood. This analogy could help us to avoid completely unrealistic interpretation of this idea: it is obvious that nobody is responsible for the fate of each human being; our possibilities are limited and should be exploited effectively (as we remember, “the road to the hell is paved with good intentions”). Nevertheless, we should help as many people as we are able to. It would be useful to exploit this analogy more profoundly. Here, I have to limit myself to this sketchy remark.

However, it deserves serious effort only if we believe that the idea of CSR is really important – but is it so? Some people (researchers, journalists, businessmen, etc.) are skeptical, even as to some practices (reports, etc.). Most radical critics of CSR regard it as a cynical form of public opinion manipulation, a form of propaganda: the only genuine objective of the declared adherence to the ideas of CSR is to gain better opinions on the part of customers, thus it is only about profit, nothing else.

F. de La Rochefoucauld (1613-1680), a French writer, once famously said: “Hypocrisy is the compliment vice pays to virtue.” I cannot participate here in a philosophical debate on relative merits of hypocrisy and cynicism. If to follow La Rochefoucauld, (relative!) priority to hypocrisy should be given: even if moral norms are not obeyed, they are regarded as such; cynicism (or nihilism) means – in its most extreme form – morality has no role to be played. Hence, even if we would agree (and a serious opinion should be based on vast empirical research) that CSR have not brought about any real effects, it has contributed to changes in declared opinions. In other words – it has contributed to changes in publicly accepted standards of “good behaviour”.

³ As noted DeGeorge, the phrase “CSR” is construed and used in different, perhaps even opposite ways. That is why, the thesis I have just formulated should be regarded as a proposal how this phrase could be used.

Now, I would like to make a remark on analogy between business and politics. Some people believe that there is an inherent contradiction between politics and morality, and the relation between business and morality is also very similar. I think that such analogy really holds but the suggested conclusion is false – due to the falsity of the premise. It means that I do not think that there is fundamental contradiction between morality and politics. Obviously, history has been delivering us a great number of instances of great and small crimes for which governments, parties or individual politicians have been responsible. However, is there no difference between bribery and mass murder? This question is rhetorical. Anyway, it is not only great cognitive error but also moral incorrectness to divide human actions (attitudes, etc.) into morally perfect (good) and morally imperfect (bad). Such approach makes the idea of moral progress meaningless. I am convinced that moral progress is possible both in personal (family, social, etc.) life as well as in such great domains of public life like business and politics. In order to avoid any teleology, it should be emphasised that it is only possible (not necessary), and not only stagnation, but also (even long-lasting) regression is possible.

To support my conviction, I would like to mention the theories of two prominent psychologists – J. Piaget (1896-1980) and L. Kohlberg (1927-1987) – who elaborated the idea of individual moral development. Drawing upon their work, J. Habermas (1929-) presented the concept of social moral development. This concept is rather controversial; nevertheless it demonstrates that the idea of moral progress does not belong to the sphere of idealistic dreams.

Assuming that moral progress/development is possible (and that the thesis is valid if referred to individuals, organisations, communities, and whole humanity), we can say that moral development of a subject (individual or collective one) is their moral duty. Applying this thesis to business organisations, we can say that they are responsible for their own moral development. What factors does the organisation's "moral character" depend on? To put it simply, on two factors: 1) on the "moral characters" of organisation's members – it depends also on the mechanisms and recruitment criteria (professional competence only or also personal traits) as well as the organisational culture; 2) the structure of the organisation and the mechanisms of its functioning (the same group of people can constitute more or less moral organisation – relatively to the structure and mechanisms).

I would like to end this part of my considerations by reminding an idea from the Preamble to the "Declaration of Human Rights." It is said there that "every human and every organ of society" should be striving for making our world to be more close to the human rights standards. Undoubtedly, each business organisation is an "organ of society." Therefore, the appeal of the "Declaration" is addressed – among others – to all businesses.

4. Final remarks

At the onset of these remarks, I would like to stress that they are intended as summary of both the present paper and the whole series of articles. For this reason this final chapter will be larger than in the previous texts.

In need to start with returning to two ideas formulated at the beginning of the first paper. Firstly, I have assumed that we live now (at the turn of centuries) at the time of many profound transformations that can be regarded as elements of the process known as “globalisation”. Secondly, the emergence and development (popularisation, etc.) of some new concepts and ideas is an element of the process of globalisation. I have decided to focus my attention on three concepts/ideas: human rights, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The choice was not incidental. “Human rights” and “sustainable development” are widely known terms and the ideas they express are – at least declaratively – almost universally accepted. The third term (corporate social responsibility) is surely less known and, what is particularly important, the ideas (hence, the question of their implementation is left aside) are much more controversial. For various reasons, these three ideas are most often studied separately. This is valid research strategy. However, an alternative one – oriented at the similarities, links, etc. among them – is, in my opinion, not only valid but even desirable.

The global system is getting more and more complex – structurally but also dynamically: we can speak about complexity of structures and also – processes⁴. In particular, we can note some mutually opposite processes (e.g. cultural homogenisation and heterogenisation). In the context of this series of papers, one pair of (apparently?) opposite processes deserves attention. On the one hand, the process of “individualisation” of human beings; the process that manifested itself in the development of humanitarianism as well as in the idea of human rights (cf. remarks in the first paper), and – in a way – even on the level of philosophy and social theory, in the form of ontological or / and methodological individualism. On the other hand, the idea of collective responsibility has been developing for the last decades: in its most radical form – the idea of whole humanity as being responsible for its own (cf. remarks in the second paper), and in less radical form – the idea of organisation’s (institution, social group, etc.) responsibility (cf. this paper). These processes are not fundamentally opposite: real (authentic, genuine, etc.) community presupposes that its members are authentic individuals. The “synchronisation” of this processes, however, is visible rather from a long perspective. From a short distance, they can be viewed even as contradictory.

A step further can be made if we ask the question: Why global community should be regarded as moral subject – bearing moral responsibility? Two complementary answers can be given. The first is based on the moral idea of brotherhood/sisterhood: each of us is responsible

⁴ This thesis refers to the general tendency but it does not exclude the possibility of some, rather “local,” phenomena of simplification.

– in a very fundamental sense – for respecting human rights in relation to any human being. However, this idea – if it is not intended to remain purely abstract one – needs concretisation. In concretised form, this concept becomes the idea of participation in activities oriented at such transformation of the world (political, economic, etc.) system into one in which human rights are increasingly respected. We should note that the idea turns out to be closely related to that of sustainability: it is enough to reformulate slightly the “Brundtlandian” definition of sustainability and to speak not about the needs of future generations but about human rights of the individuals to come. In my opinion, such reformulation does not change the essential content of this definition, but rather exposes it more fully.

The second answer is more empirically-based (in looser sense of the word). It means that it is based on the observation that unintended side effects of our human activity might destroy the natural world which is necessary not only for good life, but – first of all – just for life, for existence. An important fact is that a common interest of virtually all human beings does exist. Obviously, however, many particular (often contradictory) interests also exist. Whether common interest (to safeguard at least minimal conditions for survival) can overly exceed the power of the particular ones – this remains an open question. To some extent, it depends on the existence and content of global culture.

As already mentioned, two trends are visible: towards cultural homogenisation (sport, music, film, fashion, etc.) and towards cultural heterogenisation (revival of various ethnic cultures, development of so-called sub-cultures, increasing division between “traditionalists” and “modernists,” etc.). For various reasons, cultural homogenisation should not be welcome (it should be noted that the concept of “cultural diversity” was created following the notion of “biodiversity” – a standard element of the elaborate vision of sustainable development). However, if we accept the necessity/desirability of global responsibility, we can also have to accept the idea of global culture – being an important part of any local culture. It should be emphasised that various types of homogenisation are possible. This type which seems to be dominant today (Madonna, Maradona, Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, etc.), is not necessarily the most welcome one: at best, consumer culture does not support the sense of community (even on the lowest, family level); at worst – destroys it. Other type of global culture seems to be desirable. I believe that the ideas of human rights and of sustainable development could and should be central elements of such a culture. The big open question is how to construct it.

In respect of the concept of CSR, this idea is a part of broader *problematique*: of the problem regarding social/collective ethics. I want to precede reflections on CSR with a remark on the relations between power and moral responsibility. In the case of individual ethics, the general rule is simple: the greater one’s power (broadly construed: as the scope of actions which an individual is able to undertake), the greater their moral responsibility. It is obvious that moral responsibility of a prime minister / surgeon is greater than that of a village leader/nurse⁵.

⁵ The phrase “burden of responsibility” expresses this intuition.

I do not see any reason why this rule should not be applied to group/collective ethics. The moral responsibility of global superpowers/a ruling party is surely greater than that of microstates/debating society. It is not incidental that physicists debate the issues of their moral responsibility more often than mathematicians, and psychologists more often than linguists.

The same can be said about business organisations: the greater the power of an enterprise (corporation, multinational corporation, etc.), the greater its moral responsibility. Therefore, the controversy over responsibility of business organisation can be (partly) reduced to the question of the scope of power of such organisation.

If we are interested in the problems with CSR, we should focus our attention on the evolution of the forms of ownership and the management structures. This is a huge topic, even if we limit ourselves to ongoing evolution that started in the first industrial revolution (ca. 1770) – lasting during the last forty decades. Leaving aside all interesting details, some basic trends can be relatively easily identified: 1) growing diversity of types of ownership and management; 2) increasing role of various forms of collective ownership; 3) growing scale of activity; 4) increasing internationalisation; 5) growing ties with politics and media. Surely, some other trends could be yet identified, but these five ones should enable us to grasp the overall meaning of the evolution. It should be emphasised that all these trends intensified and accelerated after the World War II.

The post-war development of corporations should also be analysed in the context of shifting from industrial to post-industrial economy. This subject deserves a separate analysis; therefore, I will only focus on one aspect of this transformation – business expansion (its models of activity, its goals, etc.) into the area of culture (in the very broad sense of the word, comprising in particular the sphere of communication). The development of the Internet (and of all derivative organisations, such as Facebook) has revolutionised virtually all domains of human life; some of them – definitely for better, but not all of them obviously. A great number of books address these problems.

As long-term economy delivers us food, clothing, furniture and similar goods, there is little place for debates on the meaning of productive activities. Nevertheless, the situation starts to be changing when business activities influence human culture, and our biological nature – the ideas grouped and labelled as “transhumanism” seem to be supported by some corporations. Furthermore, a new type of objects is created, i.e. artificial intelligence (AI). To put it briefly: thanks to technological changes we are more and more able to change the nature of the world we live in, as well as the nature of ourselves. Should the decision about the ways in which the technological development are to be actualised be made by managers of great corporations?

If we believe in the values proclaimed in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, we believe in the equality of all people and the right to political freedom. Hence, we believe in democracy. If we believe in democracy, we should answer to that question in a definite way: no.

This remark needs some additional comments on the meaning of democracy and law-making. Democracy is a huge subject; there are many different visions of democracy – “weak” and “strong.” Free elections are the core element of “weak” vision. Public (“Habermasian”) debate – the core element of “strong” vision. I discussed elsewhere that I prefer the “strong” vision, for various reasons.

The second comment concerns the law-making. In the “strong” vision of democracy, virtually all citizens should be law-makers and politicians should play the role of moderators of public debates rather than their principal decision-makers. In particular, if such law is to settle morally fundamental problems, not organisational details of social life. This approach to law-making is motivated mainly by a view on the relations between morality and law. To put it very briefly: law should be based upon moral consensus (rather “minimal” one). Moral consensus has to be worked out. Nevertheless, if the participants of the process of working out this consensus would start from their unclear, not precisely verbalised, unorganised moral intuitions – the chances for consensus would be minimal. If participants have studied some ethics, they will be much better prepared to negotiation and the process will be much more effective and much less frustrating.

Hence, the answer to the question as to what place ethics should be granted – this answer depends on our vision of democracy. This refers in particular to business ethics and education for managers.

For this reason, I would like to complete this series of papers with some considerations on the ethics of teaching business ethics. I want to stress that by no means I am going to suggest establishing any new sub-discipline of ethics. As I declared at the beginning of my first paper, I think that we have already gone too far in the process of institutionalised specialisation. Nonetheless, addressing a few words (or even writing a separate paper) on a very narrow issue – it is a different thing.

I definitely share the opinion that one of the most important functions of education in general, and academic education in particular, is developing criticism in students. Criticism is an intellectual attitude enabling to know that one’s opinions most often are not definitely confirmed, sometimes are too general and even difficult to formulate criteria of acceptance theories and theses. Since people attend schools and universities already having many own opinions (sometimes very stiff and strongly held) thus teachers should expose mainly the opinions (theories, perspectives, etc.) alternative to those held by students (even if teachers personally share the opinions of their students).

Having graduated universities, the majority of students start their professional career and most frequently accept the opinions dominating in the organisations where they work. That is simple and evident mechanism. However, if the critical attitude was well-developed during the studies, it is possible that the acceptance of the opinions dominating in a given organisation would be less definite, enabling some changes. If the group of persons assuming critical attitudes is sufficiently large, the probability of the change of dominating opinions increases.

Another mental faculty which should be developed in students is “imagination” – the ability to be aware that that not only technical instruments, but also social structures, morality, customs, politics and every-day life can be very different than today. History, including the history of business – if properly presented – can contribute greatly to the development of imagination.

As regards skills, various groups of them (linguistic, logical, social, etc.) are important if students are to be prepared for participation in negotiations, especially if these negotiations are to satisfy both moral and praxiological requirements.

Knowledge should also be mentioned. It is obvious that management students should study basic economics, law, management theories or statistics. Nevertheless, they have some general knowledge of the world – of technology and environment, politics and culture, medicine/ biology and religions, but – first of all – of the interrelations between these and others elements of the eco-techno-socio-cultural world system of which each of us is a conscious element.

If we succeed in “opening the minds” of our students, we will contribute to making our development more and more sustainable. Let’s wish ourselves: “Good luck!”

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